

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

ER

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	D/Ex Staff				
17	C/ACIS		X		
18	D/SOVA/DI		X		
19	D/OSWR/DI		X		
20	NIO/USSR		X		
21	NIO/SP		X		
22	<i>ER</i>				
	SUSPENSE				
				Date	

Remarks

Executive Secretary
 7 Oct '87

Date

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90965THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Executive Registry

87-3381X

October 7, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
 THE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
 THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

SUBJECT: START Protocol on Conversion, Dismantlement or
 Destruction (S)

After review of the views and analysis in the START Interagency Group decision document of September 11, 1987, the following decisions have been made: (S)

Issue 1: Whether to require additional dismantlement procedures prior to removing SLBMs from accountability. (S)

Decision: Require additional dismantlement steps and replace Article IV, Paragraph 3 of the Protocol with the following: (S)

"3. After the notification period required by Article VIII, paragraph 4 of the Treaty, a Party shall initiate destruction of SLBM launchers by removing the missile launch tube hatches and their associated superstructure fairings. (S)

a. During the period of reductions required by the Treaty, an SSBN whose SLBM launchers are in the process of being dismantled or destroyed shall be considered to contain deployed missiles until the entire missile tube section of the submarine has been removed. After these actions have been carried out, the missiles removed from that SSBN will no longer be accountable as deployed missiles under the terms of the Treaty. (S)

b. After the reductions required by the Treaty have been accomplished an SSBN whose SLBM launchers are in the process of being dismantled or destroyed shall be considered to contain deployed missiles until the missile launch tube hatches and their associated superstructure fairings are removed. After these actions have been carried out, the missiles removed from that SSBN will no longer be accountable as deployed missiles under the terms of the Treaty." (S)

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Issue 2: Whether to allow converting ballistic missile submarines to attack and cruise missile carrying submarines. (S)

Decision: Omit the right to such conversion in the Protocol when it is initially tabled. Delete paragraphs 4B, 6, 7, and 8 of Article IV. Defer any decision on how to respond to a Soviet conversion proposal (or whether to table the omitted paragraphs in the absence of such a proposal) pending analysis of Soviet reaction to our Protocol and completion of analysis by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the number of submarine conversions required. (S)


Issue 3: Whether to allow conversion of heavy bombers to non-ALCM heavy bombers and to non-nuclear bombers. (S)

Decision: Allow both conversion of heavy bombers to non-ALCM heavy bombers and conversion of non-ALCM heavy bombers to non-nuclear bombers. Include Article V, Paragraph 8, but modify Article V, Subparagraph 8 (a) (ii) to read: "(Additional procedures to be agreed)." (S)

To implement these decisions: (S)

- The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is requested to prepare a revised draft Protocol on Conversion, Dismantlement or Destruction, reflecting the above decisions, for transmission to the delegation. (S)
- The START Backstopping Committee is requested to prepare appropriate instructions for tabling the Protocol. (S)
- The START Interagency Group is requested to include in the START work program a review of alternate methods of distinguishing ALCM heavy bombers from non-ALCM heavy bombers and to forward appropriate recommendations. (S)
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff are requested to provide a military analysis of the number of converted ballistic missile submarines required. This analysis should assume a START Treaty comes into force no later than December 31, 1989. It should be forwarded via the Secretary of Defense, who should comment on the fiscal implications of the proposed conversions, specifically the likelihood that the required funds will be available. The analysis and fiscal assessment should reach the National Security Council not later than October 31, 1987. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:



Frank C. Carlucci

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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MESSAGE NO. 2925 CLASSIFICATION SECRET PAGES TWO

FROM GRANT S. GREEN, JR. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (NAME) (EXTENSION) (ROOM NUMBER)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION START NSC# 90965

<u>TO (AGENCY)</u>	<u>DELIVER TO:</u>	<u>DEPT/ROOM NO.</u>	<u>EXTENSION</u>
<u>STATE</u>	<u>MELVYN LEVITSKY</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	
<u>DEFENSE</u>	<u>COL WILLIAM M. MATZ, JR.</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	
<u>CIA</u>	<input type="text"/>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	STAT
<u>JCS</u>	<u>RADM JOSEPH C. STRASSER</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT</u>	
<u>ACDA</u>	<u>WILLIAM R. STAPLES</u>	<u>EXECUTIVE SECRETARY</u>	

REMARKS _____